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NOTES
Public Employees and the First Amendment:
Connick v. Myers
INTRODUCTION

Uninhibited debate about public issues is a basic requirement
for the continued vitality of any democracy. In order to protect
this principle, the first amendment guarantees citizens' rights to
criticize government officials and agencies.' Effective government also depends, however, on the efficient administration of
its offices and agencies by these same government officials and
agencies. 2 A conflict thus may arise between government efficiency and the first amendment when the citizen exercising his
first amendment rights is a public employee. The United States
Supreme Court recently addressed the conflict between these
3
crucial interests in Connick v. Myers.
Typically, this conflict arises when a public employee speaks
criticially about his supervisor and the supervisor retaliates by
firing the employee. 4 The employee subsequently sues to get his
job back, claiming that his first amendment rights were violated
by the dismissal. The government defends its actions by asserting that the employee's critical remarks destroyed any effective
working relationship between the parties.
1. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. See infra note 19.
2. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1983).
3. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
4. This was the fact situation giving rise to the plaintiffs claim in Connick. See also
Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983) (NASA aerospace engineer demoted for making
statements critical of Space Center to the media); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (teacher dismissed for complaining about school's racially discriminatory policies); Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (teacher not
rehired after he informed a radio station about principal's memo concerning teacher
dress code); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (teacher fired for writing
letter to newspaper criticizing school board); Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909 (11th Cir.
1983) (city maintenance worker fired for suggesting to mayor that more men be added to
the work crew); Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1981) (county deputies demoted
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Courts have resolved this conflict by applying a balancing
test, weighing the employee's interest in free speech against the
government's interest in efficiency. 5 Prior to Connick v. Myers,
this test served adequately to protect both of these interests. In
Connick, however, the Supreme Court tipped the scale toward
the government's interests in three ways. First, the Court prescribed a narrow standard for matters of public concern. Second,
it limited first amendment protection when speech only partially
deals with a matter of public concern. Third, the Court did not
require that the government prove that the employee's speech
was disruptive to justify her dismissal.
This note traces the background of the conflict between the
free speech rights of public employees and the government's
interest in efficient operation. Connick v. Myers is then examined in light of this precedent. The analysis will focus on how
Connick destroyed the previous fairness of the balancing test by
strongly favoring the government's interest in efficiency. This
note will then discuss the impact of these changes on litigation
and public employee speech and, finally, will consider indications of a trend in the Supreme Court's approach to public
employee's first amendment rights.
BACKGROUND
First Amendment Rights of Public Employees: Case Law
The free expression of ideas is fundamental to a democratic
society. 6 Political debate, essential to self-government, as well as

because of their political affiliations); Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d (5th Cir.
1980) (prison guard transferred because she suggested a "sick out" to other guards to
protest discriminatory employment practices); Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (policeman fired because he said he supported a "sick-in"); Lindsay v. Board of
Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979) (professor dismissed for distributing questionnaire
to faculty); Nebraska Dep't of Road Employees Ass'n v. Department of-Roads, 364 F.
Supp. 251 (D. Neb. 1973) (engineer stated in private meeting that director of roads
department was unqualified for the position); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (policeman fired for soliciting money for political campaign).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 17-34.
6. The government may prohibit only obscene speech and speech which creates
imminent danger. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957) (obscene speech
is not protected by first amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74
(1942) (speech which creates a clear and present danger is not protected by the first
amendment).
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expressions of minor importance, are both protected by the first
amendment.7 Although the government cannot generally interfere with the free expression of ideas, the first amendment does
not prevent a private employer from firing an employee for exercising his right of free expression. 8 Unless the employee contracts to work for the employer for a specific duration, either
party can terminate the employment at will, i.e., without notice
and without cause. 9 Recently, courts have tempered this rule by
finding a variety of exceptions; 10 however, the traditional employment-at-will rule survives in almost every jurisdiction in the United States.
Prior to the 1950's, government agencies, like private employers, had free reign to fire their employees for discussing politics
or criticizing government officials.1 2 The Supreme Court had
ruled in a number of cases that because a government job was a
privilege, not a right, public employees risked termination when
they spoke out on political or other controversial public issues.1 3
This power to fire at will was somewhat abridged in the 1950's
and 1960's by a series of Supreme Court decisions in which pub-

7. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,223 (1967).
8. For cases illustrating the private employer's right to fire an employee, see Comment, Freedom of Speech in PrivateEmployment: Overcoming the "State Action" Problem, 20 Am. Bus. L.J. 102, 103 n.5 (1982).
9. See Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL
HisT. 118 (1976).
10. The exceptions are based on implied contract, public policy tort, and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At- Will Dismissals,34 STAN. L. REV. 153, 154 (1981).
11. Id. See generally Note, Contract Law: An Alternative to Tort Law as a Basis for
Wrongful DischargeActions in Illinois, 12 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 861 (1981).
12. Justice Holmes, sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, epitomized this view in his classic statement: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliff v. Mayor
of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220,29 N.E. 517,517 (1892) (upholding statute prohibiting
policemen from soliciting money for political purposes and becoming members of a political committee).
13. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding the Feinberg law,
which prohibited members of subversive organizations from teaching); Garner v. Board
of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (upholding a regulation requiring city employees to
swear they were not members of the Communist Party); United Pub. Workers of Am. v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding Hatch Act, which prohibits government workers
from political campaigning); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930) (upholding
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which disallowed public employees from soliciting
money for political reasons); ExparteCurtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (upholding statute prohibiting government employees from contributing or receiving money for political campaigns).
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lic employees successfully challenged job-required loyalty oaths. 14
The results of these cases, however, still permitted an employee
to be fired if his speech disrupted the efficient operation of a

14. Many of these cases dealt with loyalty oaths designed to determine whether an
employee was a member of a subversive (particularly Communist) group. The Supreme
Court eventually struck down most loyalty oaths because they infringed on employees'
first amendment rights to speak out on broad political issues. See, e.g., Keyishan v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 592-604 (1967) (statute barring employment to teachers who
belong to subversive organizations held invalid); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 15
(1966) (loyalty oath struck down because it prohibited "knowing but guiltless" behavior
in belonging to subversive organizations); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963)
(Seventh Day Adventist could not be denied unemployment benefits because he wouldn't
accept a job with Saturday hours due to religious belief); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278,285-88 (1961) (loyalty oath denying ever having aided communists held
unconstitutionally vague); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-96 (1961) (notary public
not required to swear to oath that he believed in God); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
485-87 (1960) (statute requiring teachers to list organizational affiliations struck down);
Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 188-91 (1952) (struck down statute requiring state
employees to take loyalty oath denying past affiliation with communists).
For a discussion of freedom of association and loyalty oaths, see T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 205 (1971); F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE
SOCIETY 341 (1981); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 795 (1978);
E. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, §§ 10-8, 12-23 (1978); Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees-an Emerging ConstitutionalRight to Be a Policeman?, 37
GEO. WASH. L REV. 409, 410 (1968); Note, Limiting Public Expression by PublicEmployees:
The Validity of Catchall Regulations, 18 Hous. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (1981). Cf. Note, Freedom of Speech in Private Employment: Overcoming the State Action Problem, 20 AM.
Bus. L.J. 102 (1982) (employee in private sector cannot rely on constitutional grounds for
reinstatement if he is fired because of his speech). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1968).
The Court referred to the potential impact on public employees' freedom of speech as a
"chilling effect." A chilling effect discourages people from lawful expression or behavior
due to fear of sanctions for illegal conduct which is not clearly defined. This is often a
result of an overbroad or vague statute. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521
(1972) (statute making abusive language a misdemeanor invalid because vague and
overbroad); Coates v. City of Cincinnnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614-16 (1971) ordinance prohibiting a gathering of people on sidewalk invalid because overly vague); Keyishan v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967) (statute barring employment to teachers belonging
to subversive organizations invalid because unconstitutionally vague); Dombrowski v.
PfLster, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Communist Control Law invalid because overly vague);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (participants in protest protected by first
amendment not liable for unlawful non-protected activity of other protestors); Wieman v.
Updegraf, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (loyalty oath invalid due to overbreadth in assuming
Communist membership is evidence that employee advocated overthrow of the government). Cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (chilling effect on plaintiff inadequate
grounds for injunction to stop lawful surveillance). See generally Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970); Note, Limiting Public Expression by Public Employees: The Validity of Catchall Regulation, 18 Hous. L. REV. 1097,
1101 (1981); Note, Title VI and CongressionalEmployees: The Chilling Effect and the
Speech or Debate Clause,90 YALE LJ. 1458, 1477-81 (1981).
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government agency. 15 The Supreme Court reasoned that if government supervisors had no authority over employee speech, a disruptive employee could impair office morale, discipline, or working relationships, and thus undermine the efficiency of the office
16
or agency.
In Pickering v. Board of Education 7 the Court recognized the
need to balance the employee's interest in free speech with the
government's interest in efficiency.' 8 The plaintiff, a high school
teacher, had sought reinstatement after the local school board
fired him for writing a letter to a newspaper for criticizing the
board's allocation of funds and the unpleasant atmosphere of
the school. The Court held that the allocation of school funds
was a matter of public concern, 9 and that it was therefore
essential that an employee, as a member of the public, be able to
discuss the topic without fear of losing his job.20 The Court also
noted that the public's interest in debate and information about
government may be enhanced when an individual, such as Pick15. See, e.g. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Ex
parteCurtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882).
16. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 168 (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing that
the public employee's procedural due process guarantee must be reconciled with the
government's interest in the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline).
17. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
18. Id. at 568.
19. The Supreme Court has held, and frequently reaffirmed, that speech about issues
of public concern deserves the strongest protection under the first amendment. See Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467-68 (1980) ("Public issue picketing ... has rested on the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values .... "); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 296-97 (1964) ("[FIreedom to discuss public affairs and public officials is
unquestionably.., the kind of speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to
keep within the area of free discussion."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)
("All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance... have the full protection of the guarantees ..
"); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("[F]ree
political discussion ... is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system ... ").
20. 391 U.S. at 571-72. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972)
(nontenured teacher cannot be dismissed without hearing when dismissal based on exercise of his free speech right). Cf. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367-68 (1983)
(military personnel penalized for racial reasons cannot maintain suit to recover damages
for constitutional violations because of the unique disciplinary structure of the military);
Kelley v.- Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1976) (regulation restricting length of policemen's hair held not a violation of constitutional rights, recognizing uniformity of dress
and espirit de corps as sufficient government interests applicable only to. policemen
because of their special role, rather than to all public employees). But cf. Pienta v. Village
of Schaumberg, 536 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 710 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1983)
(highly restrictive sick leave regulation held a violation of policemen's fundamental
rights). See generally Hirshman, Departmental Regulation of Officers' Private Lives, 6
POLICE LQ. 32 (Jan. 1977); Yaffe, Free Speech Rights of Public Employees, 2 J. CoLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 45 (1983).
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ering, is permitted to speak about matters of public concern. 21
For the Pickering Court the key issue was whether the subject
of Pickering's speech was a matter of public concern. In making
this determination, the Court considered the potential influence
that debate on an issue might have on electorate decisionmaking. 2 2 Since the allocation of school funds was determined
by election, public information about that topic was necessary to
23
educate voters.
The Court evaluated the school board's interest in efficiency
by determining whether Pickering's letter had impeded the
school's operation. Stating that government efficiency often depends on close working relationships between the employee and
his supervisor and co-workers, 24 the Court found that there was

21. 391 U.S. at 571.
22. Id. at 571-72.
23. Id. at 571. Much of the Court's treatment of matters of public concern has evolved
from cases concerning defamation of public officials. In the interest of encouraging
debate on matters of public concern, the Court has placed a very heavy burden on the
plaintiff in public figure defamation actions. Before a public figure can win a defamation
case, he must prove the defendant spoke with malice or recklessness. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (standard for public figure defamation established when an elected official of Montgomery, Ala., sued the N.Y. Times for statements
made in an advertisement which accused him of being responsible for a "wave of terror").
If the court finds a plaintiff to be a public figure, he will probably lose. The Court has
extended "public figure" status to include people other than public officials. See, e.g.,
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 44-45 (1971) (defendant considered a public figure even though he was involuntarily thrust into public limelight); Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162-65 (1967) (university athletic director considered public figure;
therefore, showing of malice required in libel action); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,
84-86 (1966) (extended "public official" to supervisor of county owned ski resort). Cf.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-36 (1979) (research director receiving federal
grant not considered a public figure in defamation case concerning senator's attack on
grant as wasteful); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (wife of wealthy
individual not considered a public figure in defamation suit concerning divorce proceedings); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 324, 352 (1974) (plaintiff not considered a
public figure because he did not voluntarily thrust himself into public limelight in the
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation). For an overview of the law of public
figure defamation, see generally J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND
FREE PRESS §§ 6:1-7-9 (1976); T. EMERSON, supra note 14, at 517; T. EMERSON, TOWARD A
GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 69 (1966); F. HAiMAN, supra note 14, at 43; J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 14, at 781; E. TRIBE, supra note 14, at § 1212; Note, FirstAmendment andPublic Employees: "'Times"Marches On, 57 GEo. L.J. 134
(1968); Comment, Source Disclosurein Public Figure Defamation Actions: Toward Greater
First Amendment Protection,33 HASTINGS UJ.623,631-36 (1981).
24. 391 U.S. at 570. More specifically, the Court noted as factors: maintenance of discipline by superiors, harmony among co-workers, and necessary personal loyalty to and
confidence in the supervisor. Id.
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no evidence that the letter had harmed essential working relationships.2 5 Consequently, Pickering was reinstated, because his
right to speak on a matter of public concern outweighed the
threat to the school's efficient operation. 26 Since then, courts
have interpreted Pickering as requiring that the government
must prove either actual impairment or the likelihood of impairment of its operations before an employee's dismissal can be
27
upheld.
In a subsequent case, Mt. Healthy Board of Education v.
Doyle,28 the Supreme Court held that a public employee fired
because he spoke out on a matter of public concern should not be
29
reinstated if he Would have been fired for other legitimate reasons.
Doyle, a teacher dismissed for informing a radio station about a
memo from the school principal concerning teacher dress code,
had behaved unprofessionally on other occasions. 30 The Court
held that it would not reinstate Doyle if the school board could
prove that it would have fired him based on his incompetence
31
even if he had not contacted the radio station.
Both Pickering and Doyle involved employees who were fired
for speaking publicly with the news media. In Givhan v. Western

25. Id. at 571.
26. Id. The Court found that the only negative impact Pickering's speech had on the
school was to anger the Board. See generally Comment, Free Speech: Dismissal of
Teacherfor Public Statement, 53 MINN. L. REV. 864 (1969).
27. See Note, The NonpartisanFreedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 365 n.4, 380. See also Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909, 912-15 (11th Cir. 1983) (no
evidence that employee's speech caused discipline or harmony problem among coworkers);
Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (insufficient evidence to prove
that policeman's statement that he supported "sick-in" was disruptive to police department).
28. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
29. Id. at 286.
30. Id. at 281-82. Doyle had been involved in a number of unprofessional incidents,
including arguments with another teacher, students, and cafeteria workers.
31. Id. at 287. The Supreme Court remanded, ordering the lower court to determine
whether the school district would have rehired Doyle if he had not called the radio station
about the principal's memo. See generally Note, supra note 27, at 375 (employee and
employer's burden under Doyle).
The Court did state, however, that it would reinstate a competent employee who was
fired solely on the basis of speech about a matter of public concern. Id. at 285-86. See also
Wolly, What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 385 (1980) (analysis of Mt.
Healthy); Note, supra note 27, at 375-79 (discussion of employee's burden and employer's
defense after Mt. Healthy); Note, First Amendment Rights-Public Employees May
Speak a Little Evil, 3 W. NEw ENG. L REV. 289, 299-301 (1980) (discussion of "but for" test
from Mt. Healthy) [hereinafter cited as Note, Public Employees].
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Line Consolidated School District,32 the Court faced a different
situation. The plaintiff, a dismissed teacher, had confined her
criticisms of school practices and policies to a series of private
meetings with her supervisor. For the first time, the Court extended first amendment protection to a public employee's private
communication. It also indicated, however, that the context (i.e.,
the time, place, and manner) of the private communication
would be considered in weighing the threat to the employer's
efficiency. 33 If the speech was communicated privately, rather
than publicly, the Court was more likely to find that the speech
disrupted government efficiency. Private communication was
considered more threatening to efficiency because a personal
confrontation was likely to harm working relationships without
the compensating benefits of public discussion of governmental
34
operations.
Four years after Givhan, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the case of Connick v. Myers. 35 Connick was factually similar
to previous public employee reinstatement cases heard by the
Court, posing once again the difficult task of balancing the conflicting interests of free speech by a public employee with the
efficient operation of a government agency.
CONNICK v. MYERS

Facts
The plaintiff, Sheila Myers, was employed for more than five
years as an assistant district attorney in New Orleans. Although
she performed competently, Myers was transferred against her
wishes to a different section of the Criminal Court. 36 On several
occasions Myers informed her supervisors, including District
Attorney Connick, that she objected to the transfer. 37 Myers
subsequently distributed a questionnaire to fellow workers solic-

32.
33.

410 U.S. 439 (1979).
Id. at 415 n.4.

34. Id. See Note, Public Employees, supra note 31, at 305.
35. 455 U.S. 999 (1982).
36. 103 S. Ct. at 1686. No question was raised concerning Myers' competence. The
Supreme Court stated in the facts of the case that Myers had performed her duties
competently.
37. Id. Myers opposed the transfer in part because of a potential conflict of interest
created by her participation in a counseling program for convicted defendants. She was
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iting their views on office policies, morale, and confidence in
supervisors. The questionnaire also asked whether employees
felt pressured to campaign in elections.38 Within a few hours,
Connick learned of the questionnaire and fired Myers immediately.3 9 Myers sued, contending that her dismissal had resulted
solely from her having distributed the questionnaire, that the
questionnaire was a valid exercise of her first amendment rights,
and that the dismissal was therefore unconstitutional. 40 The district court agreed with Myers' contention that she had been fired
because she had distributed the questionnaire. 41 Since the questionnaire addressed the effective functioning of the district attorney's office, the court held that the content of the questionnaire
dealt with a matter of public concern. 42 Furthermore, the court
found that the questionnaire did not interfere with the efficiency
of the district attorney's office.43 The Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit affirmed without opinion, 44 and Connick filed a
petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court,
45
which was granted.
The Majority Opinion
The primary focus of Justice White's majority opinion was a
balancing of Myers' interests with those of the district attorney's
office. The Court weighed Myers' interest as a citizen in free
speech against the district attorney's interest as an employer in

afraid that her new position would require her to prosecute defendants that she had previously counseled.
38. Id. at 1687. The survey consisted of questions regarding office transfer policy,
office morale, rumors and their effect on office performance, the need for a grievance
committee, level of confidence in supervisors, and whether workers felt pressured to work
in political campaigns. Id. at 1694. The Supreme Court has dealt with questionnaries and

the first amendment in a number of cases. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Right to Work, 51 U.S.L.W. 4037 (1982); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971);
Ginzburg v. Goldwater, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1967).
39. 103 S. Ct. at 1687. Connick called the distribution of the questionnaire an act of
insubordination. He particularly objected to the questions concerning confidence in
supervisors, and pressure to work in political campaigns, which, he felt, could cause public relations problems.
40. Id. Myers sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
41. 507 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. La. 1981).
42. Id. at 758.
43. Id. at 759.
44. 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981).
45. 455 U.S. 999 (1982).
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providing services efficiently. 46 The Court found that Myers had
only a limited first amendment right because the questionnaire
dealt primarily with internal office policy, and touched only
slightly upon a matter of public concern. 47 The Court applied a
balancing test to weigh Myers' limited first amendment right
against Connick's belief that the questionnaire would disrupt
office efficiency, concluding that Connick was justified in firing
48
Myers.
The Court first analyzed Myers' questionnaire to determine
whether it dealt with a matter of public concern, 49 examining its
context and content. 50 The Court determined that the questionnaire had been distributed within the context of Myers' personal
dissatisfaction with her transfer.5 1 It was not intended to inform
the public about the operation of the district attorney's office, but
52
rather to support Myers in her dispute with her supervisor.
Most of the questions dealt with office morale and discipline, topics which the Court found reflected internal office matters, not
matters of public concern. 53 Thus, the context indicated that
Myers' speech was an employee grievance, not a matter of public
concern about the operation of the district attorney's office deserving first amendment protection. 54 The Court reasoned that if the
answers to the questionnaire had been publicly released, they
55
would not have conveyed information of value to the public.
The Court recognized, however, that one question which asked
whether employees felt pressured to participate in political campaigns was of public import. 56 Since one question in fourteen did
deal with a matter of public concern, the Court held that Myers'

46.
47.
48.
49.
speech
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.

103 S. Ct. at 1685.
Id. at 1693-94.
Id. at 1694.
Id. at 1690. The Court also stated that "the inquiry into the protected status of
is one of law, not fact." Id. at 1690 n.7.
Id. at 1690. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1693. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
103 S. Ct. at 1691.
Id.

Id.

55. Id.
56. The question found to be of public concern asked, "Do you ever feel pressured to
work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates?" Id. at 1694.

The Supreme Court has consistently condemned pressure on government workers to
campaign for political reasons. See Branti v. Finkl, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (if
employee's position does not require policy-making decision, political differences with
supervisor not valid grounds for dismissal); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 348, 356-57
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questionnaire deserved at least limited protection under the first
amendment. 57 The relative weights of the two competing interests therefore became a matter of prime importance to the major58
ity's analysis.
In evaluating the questionnaire's potential for disrupting office
efficiency, the Court considered the possible threat to working
relationships, the time, place, and manner of the questionnaire's
distribution, and Myers' motivation for distributing the questionnaire.5 9 Actual proof that the questionnaire had disrupted
the efficiency of the district attorney's office was unnecessary to
justify Myers' dismissal, according to the Court. Since Myers
had only a limited first amendment interest and because close
working relationships were essential to her job, Connick's fear
that the questionnaire might disrupt the office was adequate justification for Myers' dismissal. 60 The Court also questioned
Myers' true motive in disseminating the questionnaire, stating
that her actions were obviously a result of her dispute with Connick, and, as such strengthened Connick's view that the incident
61
threatened his ability to manage the office.
The DissentingOpinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan disagreed with
nearly every aspect of the majority's analysis. Justice Brennan
claimed that the manner in which a government agency operates is a matter of public concern. 62 Because office morale and
(1976) (employee cannot be fired solely because he is not affiliated with the Democratic

Party); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 556 (1973) (Hatch Act reaffirmed); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 97-98 (1947) (Hatch Act, which prohibits public workers from politically campaigning,
held valid); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (statute prohibiting federal workers from
campaigning held constitutional). For a discussion of political campaigning and public
employees, see Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir., 1981) (sheriff not entitled to
demote or fire deputies on basis of political affiliations); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 14, at 826.

57. 103 S. Ct. at 1694.
58. Id. at 1691. If the Court had not found even a limited first amendment right, it
would have considered Myers' dismissal a personnel decision. In such a case, the Court
would not have reached the issue of whether Connick was justified in firing Myers.
59. Id. at 1692. The Court labeled this "the context in which the dispute arose."
60. Id. The Court cautioned that "a stronger showing may be necessary if the
employee's speech more substantially involve[s] matters of public concern." Id. at 1692-93.
61. Id. at 1693.
62. Id. at 1695 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966)). In Mills, the Court held unconstitutional a statute which provided criminal penal-
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transfer policy are factors which may affect efficiency of operations within that government agency, such matters are of public
concern. 6 3 According to the dissent, Pickering had established
that discussion about how government agencies operate is vital
to informed decision-making by the public. 64 A broader standard
than the majority had applied was, in the dissent's view, more
appropriate in determining whether a subject is of public concern. This broader standard should include subjects with the
potential to inform people about the way a government official
65
handled his responsibilities.
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's application of
the context factor. The context in which Myers had distributed
the questionnaire should not have been considered when determining whether it dealt with a matter of public concern. 66 According to Justice Brennan, how, why, and where a public
employee speaks is relevant as to the threat to government efficiency, but irrelevant as to whether that speech is on a matter of
public concern. The dissent argued that context should not have
been considered in determining whether Myers deserved first
amendment protection. Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School District67 guaranteed that speech on matters of public
concern is protected by the first amendment, regardless of how
and where it is communicated. 68

ties for publication of a newspaper editorial on election day which urged people to vote a
certain way. The Court reasoned that a major purpose of the first amendment is to protect discussion about how government operates. 384 U.S. at 218-20.
63. 103 S. Ct. at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id. The determination of whether a matter is one of public concern is often a
difficult one because the judge must speculate as to whether the public would consider the
topic important. Id. at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 1696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. 439 U.S. 410 (1979). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
68. 103 S. Ct. at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Pickering,391 U.S. at 571-72.
The Connick dissent cited Givhan as establishing that "context" is improper to consider
when determining whether an employee's speech is protected. It is true that Givhan protects speech of public importance regardless of "how and where" it is expressed. Connick,
103 S. Ct. at 1696-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4). Givhan
did not hold, however, that "why" an employee spoke is irrelevant to the question of
protection. The Connick majority's application of "context" indicates that it was really
examining Myers' motivation for speaking, and not how and where she spoke. "[T]he
focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office, but rather to
gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors." 103 S. Ct. at
1691 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 1690, 1693, 1698; supra text accompanying
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Finally, the dissent disagreed with the holding that Myers'
questionnaire deserved only limited first amendment protection.
The questionnaire deserved full protection because the Court recognized one question as a matter of public concern. 69 Therefore,
the district attorney should have been required to prove that the
questionnaire actually disrupted the office in order to justify
Myers' dismissal. 70 The controlling and applicable standard, according to Justice Brennan, had been established in Tinker v.
Des Moines Community School District,7 1 which held that only
speech which materially and substantially interferes with an
institution's operations may be suppressed. 72 According to the
dissent, the majority holding in Connick was inconsistent with
Tinker because the Connick holding did not require the government to prove that Myers' questionnaire was disruptive. The dissent argued that the broad discretion granted to supervisors by
this case would ultimately have the effect of deterring both protected and unprotected speech by public employees.7 3 As a result,
less information regarding government operations would be available to the public. 74
ANALYSIS

Changes in the Balancing Test
Connick altered the balancing test to the extent that the
government's interest in efficiency of operations is now favored
over the first amendment rights of public employees in three
ways. First, constitutional protection is now extended to fewer
subjects. Second, speech dealing only partially with matters of
public concern is afforded only limited protection. Third, evidence that speech was actually disruptive is not required to justify an employee's dismissal.

notes 32-33. A semantic confusion between the majority and dissent concerning the word

"context" weakens the dissent's reasoning.
69. 103 S. Ct. at 1700 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (citedin Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1701 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
72. Id. at 569-70.
73. 103 S. Ct. at 1701 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent recommended that judges,
not supervisors, determine whether the employee's speech was disruptive.
74. Id. at 1702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A Narrower Concept of Matters of Public Concern
The Connick majority found that Myers' questionnaire dealt
more with internal grievances than with matters of public concern because debate about transfer policy is not a form of speech
which would inform the public about how the district attorney's
office had handled its duties. 75 In contrast, Mt. Healthy Board of
Education v. Doyle76 held that speech about a teacher dress code
was a matter of public concern. Dress code, office policy, and
morale are similar subjects in that they all affect employee
behavior. By affecting employee behavior, these subjects also
tend to affect efficiency within a government agency. Since the
subjects similarly affect government efficiency, the contrary holdings in Connick and Mt. Healthy suggest that the Court has cut
back on the subjects that it considers matters of public concern.
This narrowed view is inconsistent with the Court's recognition that a major purpose of the first amendment is to protect
speech about the way government operates. 77 Strong protection
of such speech assures that voters will remain informed about
government operations. 78 The Court's narrow view of matters of
public concern leaves "morale and office policy" unprotected by
the first amendment, 79 even though these topics affect the opera80
tions of government agencies.
Furthermore, the Court has recognized that it is difficult for
judges to determine whether a matter is of public concern because
such a ruling is inherently subjective.8 ' An example of this subjectivity is the disparity of the findings of the majority and the

75. Id. at 1684, 1690 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (the Supreme Court accepted the district court's finding that
Doyle's speech was clearly protected by the first amendment).
77. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966). Alexander Mieklejohn, an emminent
first amendment scholar, viewed only communication that dealt with the process of selfgovernment as being protected by the first amendment, while other speech is protected
primarily by the fifth amendment. Another emminent first amendment scholar, Zechariah Chaffee, found it impossible to draw a line between speech about public and private
matters. For a discussion of these two viewpoints, see generally Chaffee, Book Review, 62
HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949).
78. See Pickering,391 U.S. at 571-72; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 74, 74-75 (1965);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
79. 103 S. Ct. at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Id. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
81. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) ("[T]he citizenry is
the final judge of the proper conduct of public business."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1970)) (which
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dissent in Connick. Five justices held that the subject matter was
not of public concern, 82 while four justices reached the opposite
conclusion.8 3 In addition, a New Orleans newspaper had covered
Myers' dismissal extensively, along with a number of other matters affecting the internal operations of the district attorney's
office.8 4 The publication of these stories suggests that readers
were interested in the controversy in Connick, thus illustrating
that the public considered the issues involved important. The
combination of a narrow standard and an inherently subjective
ruling creates a risk that some speech deserving protection may
be left unprotected. This approach to granting protection to
speech is thus inadequate, because it does not incorporate the
Court's own view that speech about public matters should be
85
strongly protected.
Limited Protection of Speech Partially a Matter
of Public Concern
The majority opinion is ambiguous as to how significantly
expression must deal with a matter of public concern in order for
it to be fully protected by the first amendment. Myers' questionnaire received only limited first amendment protection because
only one question in fourteen concerned a matter of public interest.86 It is unclear whether Myers' questionnaire would be fully

protected if, for example, she had asked only two questions, one
protected and one not. It is evident only that one question on an
issue of public concern, amidst thirteen other questions of less
importance, is not enough to warrant full protection.
In light of the Court's highly protective treatment of fundamental rights,87 an inquiry about a violation of a fundamental
recognized the "additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad

hoc basis which publications address issues of general or public interest"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (free expression puts "the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us").
82. 103 S. Ct. at 1693-94.
83. Id. at 1697 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1697 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A New Orleans newspaper, the Times
Picayune, carried five stories following Myers' case from 1980 through 1982. The paper
also ran two stories on internal problems within the district attorney's office. One article
discussed the district attorney's new offices. Another article reported that the State
Senate prohibited Connick from retaining a public relations specialist.
85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
86. 103 S. Ct. at 1693-94.
87. The Supreme Court has held that the government must show a compelling inter-
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right deserves full protection by the first amendment, even though
other less important questions are also asked. The Court was
inconsistent when it first noted the importance of the one question concerning coercion to politically campaign,8 8 and later
stated that the "questionnaire touched upon matters of public
concern in only a most limited sense. '8 9 The Court had recognized that official pressure on public employees to campaign is a
violation of a fundamental right.9 0 Connick's limited protection
of Myers' speech is thus inconsistent with the Court's earlier
findings that a public employee has a fundamental right to
speak about matters of public concern.9 1 Furthermore, Connick's
holding is inconsistent with Pickering because, even though
92
Pickering's letter had criticized the atmosphere of the school,
the Court had granted Pickering full first amendment protection.9 3 In Pickering, once the Court found allocation of school
94
funds a matter of public concern, the letter was fully protected.
First amendment protection was not decreased because of other
less important topics also discussed in Pickering's letter.
Evidence of Disruption Not Required
Pickering recognized that factors such as maintenance of discipline, harmony among co-workers, and loyalty to and confidence in the supervisor often affect the efficient operation of an
office or workplace.9 5 The District Court in Connick considered
these factors in evaluating whether Myers' speech was disrup-

est to justify infringement on an individual's fundamental rights. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16-19 (1966) (law penalizing membership in subversive organization

without personal intent to further organization's illegal action held invalid); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (government prohibited from denying unemployment
benefits to person with religious reasons for not working on Saturdays); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-31 (1963) (statute prohibiting attorneys from contacting prospective
litigants held invalid when attorneys working without compensation to defend civil liberties violations of clients); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960) (statute requiring
teacher to list membership in organizations held to be an unjustifiable interference with
freedom to associate).
88. 103 S. Ct. at 1691.
89. 103 S.Ct. at 1691, 1693.
90. See supranote 56.
91. Pickering,391 U.S. at 571-72. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
92. Pickering,391 U.S. at 575-78.
93. Id. at 571-72.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 570.
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tive, and concluded that there was no evidence that the questionnaire had adversely affected Myers' work or her relationship
with her supervisors. 96 Although the Supreme Court agreed there
was no evidence of disruption, it nevertheless held that Conbe disruption was adequate justificanick's fear that there might
97
dismissal.
tion for Myers'
This broad deference to Connick's fear of disruption appears to
modify Pickering, which required actual proof of disruption in
order to justify dismissal. 98 It also contradicts Tinker, which
required proof of disruption in an analogous circumstance. 99
Connick's office and Tinker's school were environments which
both demanded a sensitive balance of orderly decorum and free
expression. It would therefore be reasonable and consistent with
the Court's treatment of allegedly disruptive expression to require
the same burden of proof for the government in both settings. 100
The Court, in Tinker, noted that "students don't shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."101 Likewise, public employees do not shed their
rights to free speech at the office doorstep.
Pickering and Tinker were astute decisions because they protected both free expresison and government efficiency by requiring actual proof of disruption. In contrast, Connick is a much
narrower view because it protects only order, and not free expres-

96. 507 F. Supp. 752, 758 (E.D. La. 1981). Accord Pickering,391 U.S. at 568-73.
97. 103 S. Ct. at 1692, 1694. The Court cautioned that a stronger showing might be
required "if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public con-

cern." Id. at 1693.
98. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-71. Pickering's dismissal was held unjustified partly
because there was no evidence that his speech disrupted the school.
99. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 509
(noting the "special characteristics" of the school environment). See supra notes 69-71
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the burden of evidence in Tinker, see J.
BARRON & C. DIENES, supranote 23, § 3:11; T. EMERSON, supra note 14, at 607.
100. "Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, the prohibition cannot be sustained." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. See also Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915,
918-19 (5th Cir. 1980) (government required to clearly demonstrate that employee's conduct substantially interfered with his job); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966) (high school authorities enjoined from forbidding students from wearing "freedom
buttons" which did not cause substantial interference with school operations). Cf. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966) (prohibition of
freedom buttons in a high school held valid because students wearing buttons created a

disturbance).
101. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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sion, by holding that a mere apprehension of disruption justifies
an employee's dismissal. The Connick decision indicates that
public employees' rights concerning freedom of expression will
not be extended in the near future, and that they may be further
limited.
IMPACT
Litigation
As a result of the Connick decision, it may now be significantly more difficult for a public employee to win a job reinstatement action based on a first amendment violation, because
few expressions will meet Connick's narrow standards for according full first amendment protection. If a public employee speaks
on an issue recognized as a matter of public concern, as well as
other matters that are not protected, he will only have a limited
first amendment interest. 10 2 The protected status of the employee's speech thus will be a crucial point in litigation of this
nature. If the employee's speech is not fully protected, he will
probably lose the action. The outcome of Connick illustrates that
a limited first amendment interest is insufficient for an employee
103
to prevail.
Furthermore, if the employee had a limited first amendment
interest and his job required close working relationships, the
government's burden of proof is apparently a minimal one. It
thus will be extremely difficult for an employee to successfully
rebut a supervisor's claim that he feared the employee's speech
would cause office disruption. Consequently, the government will
most likely prevail whenever close working relationships are
10 4
necessary to the employee's job.

102. If an employee speaks about private matters, the first amendment still offers
some protection. For example, a public employee's criticism of his boss may not protect
him from being fired for his remark. The first amendment, however, would still protect
him if his boss sued for libel. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976) (Court would
not reinstate policeman fired for insubordination because his speech was not constitutionally protected).
103. "The limited first amendment interest here does not require that Connick tolerate
action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority,
and destroy close working relationships." 103 S. Ct. at 1694.
104. This will affect many employees, since most jobs require close working relationships. Only an employee who works totally independently of others would not depend on
relationships to do his job effectively.
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Public Employees' Speech

The most detrimental impact of Connick will be its potential
chilling effect on public employees' freedom of speech. Employees
will be reluctant to speak critically about their employing agencies and supervisors due to fear of job dismissal. The Court noted
in Pickering that "the threat of dismissal from public employment is ... a potent means of inhibiting speech."' 105 Employee
apprehension concerning freedom to speak may be warranted
particularly when the topics concern internal agency policies,
supervisors, or morale. Most employees are likely to remain
silent rather than risk their jobs by discussing unprotected
topics.
An even greater threat to free expression is that employees will
be silent on topics that Connick protects. Because of the subjective nature of determining whether a matter is of public concern,
employees are likely to steer clear of unprotected topics as well as
remain silent about protected topics. 10 6 This "chilling effect" on
speech is the kind of suppression that the Supreme Court has
07
consistently condemned.
Consider, once again, the facts of Pickering in light of Connick. Pickering might very well have been discouraged from
writing his letter because he would have been unsure of whether
a judge would find allocation of school funds a matter of public
concern, and thus deserving of protection. Even if he felt confident that "school funds" was a fully protected topic, he might
hesitate to include discussion of school atmosphere and morale
in his letter because his letter would then be accorded only
limited first amendment protection. If Connick had been law at
that time, it is possible that Pickering would not have written his
letter for fear it would cost him his job.
This threat to free expression affects a substantial number of
citizens in the United States in that more than fifteen million
persons in the United States are public employees.1 0 8 In addi-

105. Id. at 574.
106. "When one must guess what conduct or utterance might lose him his position,
one necessarily will 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone'...." Keyishan v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (citing Speiser v. Kandall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). See
Note, The Chilling Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69 COLuM. L REv. 808, 824 (1969).
107. See supra note 14.
108. As of June 1982, 15,817,000 people, or 17.6% of the work force in the United States
were in the public employ. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
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tion, the chilling effect may also impede the public's access to
information about government.10 9 Public employees are a valuable source of information about governmental operations, because their ideas may enhance public debate by adding an
"insider's" view of how government operates. 1 0 Any potential
decrease in information about government operations and officials may therefore undermine government officials' efficiency
and honesty. In addition, the government's minimal burden of
proof will increase public officials' authority over employee
speech. This could result in censorship and unnecessary secrecy
within government agencies, both of which may pose threats to
the democratic process."'
RETURN TO THE EQUITABLE BALANCING TEST

The balancing test must be revised in order to weigh fairly
both employee and government interests. First, a broader standard for determining matters of public concern should be utilized
to expand those areas of protected speech beyond the narrow

UNITED STATES: 1982-83, 394 (103d ed. 1982). "Any restrictions placed upon the free
speech rights of such a large proportion of our work force should be a matter of grave
concern." T. EMERSON, supranote 14, at 563. See Note, supra note 27, at 365 n.1.
109. The Supreme Court has recognized that the first amendment protects the listener's right to receive information and ideas. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
School Dist. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2807-08 (1982) (disallowed removal of books from
library based on students' right to receive information); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (citizens entitled to
price information about generic drugs); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)
(attorney general ordered to grant visa to controversial foreigner who many people were
interested in hearing speak); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-401
(1969) (upheld FCC regulations requiring broadcaster to allow editorial replies); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (individual can review obscene information in privacy
of own home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1964) (statute prohibiting
distribution of information on birth control held invalid); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 505 (1946) (trespass conviction for distributing religious literature in company-owned
town reversed). But see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (FCC sanction
for broadcast of adult program during daytime upheld); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (gas company not allowed to
include information about low price of natural gas with bills because would encourage
energy waste). See generally Baldasty & Simpson, The Deceptive 'Right to Know.- How
Pessimism Rewrote the First Amendment, 56 WASH. L REV. 365 (1980); Note, The First
Amendment in the Classroom: LibraryBook Removals and the Right of Access to Information, 23 B.C.L REv. 1471 (1982).
110. See generally WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (R. Nader, P. Petkas, K. Blackwell eds. 1972).
111. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718-19, 723-24 (1971) (no
prior restraint on publication of Pentagon papers); Schenck v. United States, 247 U.S. 47,
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confines of Connick. Protected subjects should include topics
that may inform citizens about how government officials handle
their responsibilities. 112 This protection would substantially eliminate the chilling effect, resulting in more information being
made available to the public concerning the way government
operates. In addition, a broader standard would compensate for
the inherently subjective nature of the judicial decision as to
whether a particular matter is of public concern. 113 Second,
speech that is even partially about a matter of public concern
should be fully protected. If an employee speaks about a matter
of public concern, as well as an unprotected topic, her protection
should not be reduced to a limited first amendment interest.
Third, the balancing test must protect the government's interest
in efficiency as well as the employee's interest in free and uninhibited debate about governmental operations. The government
should have the burden of proving that the employee's speech
materially and substantially interfered with office efficiency.
The employee could then rebut the evidence of disruption offered
by the government. This standard would allow the government to
fire an employee whose speech disrupts the office, but it would not
114
allow a dismissal based on a mere apprehension of disruption.
It is likely that Connick v. Myers would have been decided
differently if the aforementioned alternatives were applied. Myers'
questionnaire would have had full first amendment protection,
because all questions concerned policies and morale which poten-

52 (1919) (clear and present danger found justifying restraint of document during wartime). Cf. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (heavy
burden required to justify prior restraint); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
719-20 (1931) (prior restraint not allowed to protect nonemergency government interest).
See generally Bickel, An Examination of the Unruly Contest Between Free Speech and
the Needs of Government; The Wide Open First Amendment, STUDENT LAWYER, Jan.
1973, at 40; Franch, Balancing National Security and Free Speech, 14 N.Y.U. J. INTL'
LAw & PoL 339 (1983); Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case
of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1971); Note, Prior Restraint Enforced
Against Publication of Classified Material by CIA Employee, 51 N.C.L. REV. 865 (1973);
Comment, Government Secrecy Agreements and the First Amendment, 28 Am. U.L. REV.
397 (1979).
112. 103 S. Ct. at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the process of
informed decision-making and its importance to self-government, see Z. CHAFFEE, BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 102 (1956); T. EMERSON, supra note 14, at 8; A. MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH
1 (1948); J.S. MILL, Representative Government, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD
341-50 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952).
113. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
114. 103 S. Ct. at 1702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tially affected the efficiency of the office, and would therefore
have met the broader standard for matters of public concern.
Even if some of her questions had not concerned topics which
affected office efficiency, her speech would still have been fully
protected. In addition, the government's mere apprehension that
Myers' questionnaire might be disruptive would not have been
adequate jusitification for her dismissal. Since there was no evidence that the questionnaire substantially and materially interfered with the efficient operation of the office, the government
would not have met its burden of proof. Consequently, Myers
would have been reinstated because her free speech interest
would have outweighed the government's interest in the efficient
operation of the district attorney's office.

CONCLUSION

When a public employee is fired for speaking critically about
his agency or supervisor, a conflict arises between the employee's
right to free speech and the government's interest in efficiency.
The Supreme Court weighs these conflicting interests by applying a balancing test. This conflict was the central issue in Connick v. Myers. For the first time, the Court's application of this
test heavily favored the government's interest. The test now provides first amendment protection to fewer subjects than it previously did. In addition, speech that deals only partially with
matters of public concern receives only limited protection. Furthermore, the Connick test does not require that the government
prove that the employee's speech was disruptive as a justification for his dismissal. As a result, government employees are
more likely to lose job reinstatement actions based on first
amendment claims. More importantly, Connick will also deter
employees from speaking critically about public agencies and
officials, resulting in less information about government agencies being made available to the public.
To avoid these suppressive results, the equitable nature of the
balancing test must be restored. Matters of public concern must
be defined more broadly, and full protection should be granted to
speech that deals even only partially with matters of public concern. The government should also be required to prove that the
employee's speech disrupted the efficient operation of the agency
in order to justify his dismissal. Restoration of a fair test is
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essential to the protection of public employees' free speech rights,
and to the government's interest in efficiency of its operations
and the public's access to information about its government.
CHRISTINE M. ARDEN

